Labor Law Test 1.txt

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Labor Law Test 1.txt
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  1. Vegelahn v. Guntner
    year and court
    1896

    MA Supreme Court
  2. Vegelahn v. Guntner
    summary
    injunction bans both peaceful and non peaceful picketing, Holmes dissent says unpeaceful is illegal but that group efforts (unions) of peaceful persuasion are legal
  3. Vegelahn v. Guntner
    facts
    • Plantiff: Vegelahn, a furniture manufacturer
    • Defendant: Guntner, repping the EEs (upholsterers)

    • Vegelahn is trying to get an injunction to stop his picketing EEs lead by gutner. They wanted a price-list (for wages) and a nine hour work day. Veg said no, and EEs walked
    • off the job. Veg employed replacement workers. EEs picketed in front of the
    • plant, at times they were large enough to obstruct people from entering,
  4. Vegelahn v. Guntner
    holding
    • preliminary injunction: all picketing is unlawful
    • holmes' injunction: only non peaceful is unlawful
    • PI stands
  5. Vegelahn v. Guntner
    reasoning
    • 1. Employment at will: ERs have right to hire labor at whatever wage is mutually agreed upon and EEs have the right to work at that wage
    • 2. In MA it's a criminal offense to intimidate or force or prevent or seek to prevent someone from working
    • 3. non-peaceful picketing is intimidation indirectly to the ER but directly to his EEs
    • 4. patrolling and picketing is illegal
    • 5. injunction granted to all those involved
  6. Vegelahn v. Guntner
    dissent
    • 1. there is no proof of any threat or danger that comes from peaceful picketing
    • 2. an injunction is only legal if it prevents threatening or physical harm
    • 3. first injunction assumes peaceful picketing is always threatening or harmful, and that's not true
    • 4. peaceful picketing may cause temporal damages through persuasion
    • 5. however, temporal damage is justified in free-market competition
    • 6. defendants are entitled to compete with their former employer just as a small business would
    • 7. the fact that this is a collective action changes nothing, unions are legit
  7. Adkins v. Children's hospital
    year and court
    1923

    • Supreme Court of the
    • United States
  8. Adkins v. Children's hospital
    facts
    DC wants a min wage for women, arguement is that it is a violation of the right to liberty to freely contract one's labor at whatever wage is mutually agreed upon by both EE and ER
  9. Adkins v. Children's hospital
    holding
    • the fixed minimum wage for
    • women in d.c. is an unconstitutional infringement on the 5th
    • amendment guarantee that an individual cannot be deprived of liberty w/o due
    • process of law
  10. Adkins v. Children's hospital
    reasoning
    • 1. the 5th amendment allows someone to enter into a contract to sell their labor at whatever price is mutually agreed upon
    • 2. government can only interfere when they are enacting their police power (states are entitled to protect cictzen's welfare, safety, health and morals)
    • 3. however, the right to contract is not boundless, there are exceptional circumstances where the gov can interfere:
    • +1st exception: if the business serves the public interest
    • +2nd exception: if the government itself is contracting with a private party
    • +3rd exception: statutes describing the character, methods and time for payment of wages
    • +4th exception: statutes fixing hours of labor
    • 4. none of these exceptions apply to a minimum wage law
    • 5. also, law doesn't take into account the variations among women's circumstances
    • 6. doesn't necessarily "protect the morals" of women
    • 7. ignores the ER's needs and put the burden on the ER to care for the EE, which isn't fair
    • 8. entitles women to money they didn't necessarily work for
  11. Adkins v. Children's hospital
    issue
    • is the fixed minimum
    • wage for woman in d.c. an unconstitutional infringement on the 5th
    • amendment guarantee that an individual cannot be deprived of liberty w/o due
    • process of law?; the law for a minimum wage
    • for women in d.c. “is attacked upon the ground that it authorizes an
    • unconstitutional interference with the freedom of contract included within the guaranties of the due process
    • clause of the fifth amendment. That the right to contract about one’s affairs
    • is a part of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause”; does this
    • law qualify as one of the exceptional circumstances that justify the
    • breaking of a contract by the government
  12. Adkins v. Children's hospital
    dissent
    • Taft:
    • 1. there is not equal bargaining power between EEs and sometimes greedy ERs, ERs are in a position of much greater power and a min wage law serves to equalize this difference; the sweating system
    • 2. should be assumed that the set min wage would be determined fairly and would only take from extra ER earnings
    • 3. min hours is the same as min wage (exception 4)
    • 4. min wage does not mean max wage
    • 5. exception 3 applies to min wage because it affects the EE's ability to enjoy the wages and the ER's bargaining power similarly
    • 6. women are in a weaker spot than men, still need to be protected
    • Holmes:
    • 7. if people who are professionals at determining wage in relation to well-being think the min wage is a good idea, it probably is
    • 8. the whole point of the statue is to protect women EEs against those ERs who may take advantage of their vulnerable employment position, it protects the well being of women like so many other laws
    • 9. it might hurt some, but the aggregate benefit is worth it
  13. Vegelahn v. Guntner
    question
    • Can the court enjoin
    • peaceful picketing among EEs if it interferes with the ERs business?
  14. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
    year and court
    • 1937
    • Supreme Court
  15. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
    Facts
    • “Minimum Wages for
    • Women” law says that women and minors must work in decent conditions and get
    • paid decent wage to protect their health and morals. The ‘industrial welfare
    • commission’ determines this wage. Washington state can do this under their
    • police and sovereign power. If the wages were considered inadequate, there
    • would be a conference and the commission would decide on the wage that should
    • be mandated.



    • Elsie parrish is a
    • chambermaid who wants to recover the difference between the wages paid to her
    • and the minimum wage fixed by the law, which was $14.50 per week of 48 hours.



    • Trial court rejected
    • law, appeals court/supreme court of washington supported the law.
  16. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
    Issue
    • is the minimum
    • wage law in the state of Washington an unconstitutional infringement on the 14th
    • amendment guarantee that individuals cannot be deprived of liberty without due
    • process of law?
  17. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
    holding
    • Adkins v. children’s
    • hospital should be overruled, the law is valid and constitutional
  18. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
    reasoning
    • 1. yes, we are guaranteed the right to liberty, but it is still subject to the control of the government when it comes to protecting someone's health, safety, morals, and welfare (police powers)
    • 2. in many cases, where EEs are not on equal footing regarding bargaining power, the government can intervene to protect their health
    • 3. muller v. oregon specificly limits # of hours women can work to protect them, same thing
    • 3.5. women need special protection
    • 4. the committee will determine "fair wages", and ultimately an ER won't hire someone if the wage is too little, really only getting rid of those businesses that are too weak to survive fairly, protects against sweating system, ERs are sometimes selfish
    • 5. really, this affirms freedom to liberty by making things more fair for EEs, not liberty to contract if there is unequal bargaining power
    • 6. EEs who don't get paid enough have to be support by welfare which are tax dollars, so the general population carries the burden of selfish ERs
    • 7. may hurt some, but aggregate benefit is worth it
  19. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish
    dissent
    • 1. decision made in light of current economic state but that isn't enough to change the constitution
    • 2. constitution can't be changed by events alone, not circumstantial, meaning of constitution doesn't change bc of economic circumstances
    • 3. we already decided this in Adkins
    • 4. the right to contract is protected in the 14th amendment only in EXCEPTIONAL circumstances, we already have those 4 things and wages are not hours
    • 5. earning money they don't deserve
    • 6. women are equal to men
    • 7. min wages could lead to max wages which is a slippery slope
  20. BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK v O'NEIL
    year and court
    1945, Supreme Court, STATUTORY law for FLSA
  21. BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK v O'NEIL
    facts
    • Section 16(b) of Congressional Fair
    • Labor Standards Act of 1938 says that an ER who violates the minimum wage
    • act owes an EE unpaid minimum wage or unpaid overtime compensation as liquidated
    • damages
    • -445: O'Neil was fired and went to get pay unpaid overtime, got full overtime if he agreed not to sue for LD, takes check and sues
    • -554: dize v maddix, maddix was not paid full overtime or LD, takes check for part of payment and agrees not to sue, sues for full wages and LD
    • -421: is interest recoverable under 16b for unpaid wages or LD
  22. BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK v O'NEIL
    issue
    • -in an non-bona fide dispute, can an EE waive FLSA 16b rights to liquidated damages in exchange for full unpaid wages? (455)
    • -in a non-bona fide dispute, can an EE waive FLSA 16b rights to LD is exchange for partial unpaid wages (554)
    • - are EEs entitled to interest on top of unpaid wages and LD?
  23. BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK v O'NEIL
    reasoning
    • upon interpreting the law:
    • 1. it reads "SHALL", which means its a must/mandatory
    • 2. congrees grants private rights for the public interest, but you can't waive rights when it goes aggainst the purpose of the law

    • 3. why FLSA shouldn't be waived:
    • -it protects national health and well being (not getting paid reduces standard of living)
    • -effects the free flow of commerce
    • -equalizes bargaining powers (EEs would sign waiver against their will because they need the $)
    • -undermines congressional authority

    4. if we waive this, we make it possible for ERs to not pay in full and force EEs to waive rights or sue

    421: getting both is not fair, it's like getting double compensation of what is owed to you (interest on interest)
  24. BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK v O'NEIL
    holding
    No, an EE cannot wait rights to LD in both fully paid and partially paid wages situations

    No to interest on unpaid wages or LD
  25. exceptions to employment at will:
    -FLSA: min wages, OT, LD, limits child labor
  26. BROOKLYN SAVINGS BANK v O'NEIL
    dissent
    • dissenting on 445, agrees on 554
    • 1. first of all, in NY the law says that if you sign a contract and you didn't understand or agree with what it says, it doesn't matter bc you signed it
    • 2. if EE gets paid full unpaid, he should be able to waive LD
    • 3. LD is a private claim which is not guaranteed in the public itnterest, can be waived, LD is optional and you have to apply for it where as MM/OT are necessary
    • 4. for MW/OT there are criminal provisions, but there are not any criminal provisions for LD
    • 5. but if you don't get the full unpaid, the contract is invalid, does not meet full accord originally which makes it void
  27. FLSA
    who's covered?
    who's exempted?
    • covered:
    • -inter-state commerce
    • -ERs and EEs, depending on economic reality test

    • exempt:
    • -white-collar
    • -some industry specific
  28. RUTHERFORD FOOD CORP. V. MCCOMB
    year and court
    • 1947
    • supreme court
  29. RUTHERFORD FOOD CORP. V. MCCOMB
    facts
    • -mccomb is the department of labor
    • -kraiser food company didn't keep good records and says that certain workers aren't EEs so they don't have to pay them OT

    • work process at rutherford: EEs of kraiser slaughter animals, the WORKERS cut off portions and take the bones out, pass it through to the trimmer, gets on truck to interstate commerce
    • -kraiser and reed choose workers to debone meat and reed is in charge of them and paying them
  30. RUTHERFORD FOOD CORP. V. MCCOMB
    issue
    Are the workers at Rutherford Food comp. EEs? Who is an EE under FLSA?
  31. RUTHERFORD FOOD CORP. V. MCCOMB
    holding
    Yes, there are EEs
  32. RUTHERFORD FOOD CORP. V. MCCOMB
    reasoning
    • -language in the statue is not specific enough
    • -so, we must make up a test to determine (economic reality test):
    • : integrated economic unit with common objective?
    • : where is the work preformed?
    • : who controls worker activities?
    • : does operation depend on their initiative, judgement or foreseight of worker?
    • : who provides tools, materials, equipment?
    • : material changes to the contract?
    • : dependent business organization?
    • -all factors must be considered on an individual basis
  33. RUTHERFORD FOOD CORP. V. MCCOMB
    legal principle
    the economic reality test to determine if a worker is an EE!
  34. BELIZ v W.H. MCLEOD & SONS PACKING CO.
    year and court
    • 1985
    • 5th circuit of appeals
  35. BELIZ v W.H. MCLEOD & SONS PACKING CO.
    facts
    • McLeod owns a farm and contracts with Galan to find workers to pick veggies
    • Galan is ER of farmworkers
  36. BELIZ v W.H. MCLEOD & SONS PACKING CO.
    issue
    + do the workers have a FLSA EE/ER realtionship with McLeod?+ can they prove violations without proper documentation of wages paid and hours worked?
  37. BELIZ v W.H. MCLEOD & SONS PACKING CO.
    holding
    Yes, there is sufficient evidence that workers have a FLSA EE/ER elationship with McLeod. Also, their verbal commentary/testimony is evidence enough
  38. BELIZ v W.H. MCLEOD & SONS PACKING CO.
    reasoning
    • +court must apply economic reality test
    • 1. integrated economic unit? yes, common objective to harvest crops
    • 2. Where is the work preformed? on McLeod's farm
    • 3. who controls worker's activities? Galan supervised workers, McLeod supervised Galan; McLeod controlled when/who could work, if they were productive enough, when to move to the next field; Galan paid them after mcleod paid him
    • 4. rely on their initiative/judgement? not really, low skill level, basically at McLeod's discretion
    • 5. tools, materials, equipment: all belong to McLeod
    • 6. material change to the contract? No
    • 7. independent business org? not really, galan asked permission to take them elsewhere

    +decided that galan was an EE of McLeod

    • 2nd question: uncertainty of damages does not justify not recovery
    • -damages are awarded on reasonable inference based on evidece (verbal testimony)
    • -FLSA said ERs had to keep records
  39. BELIZ v W.H. MCLEOD & SONS PACKING CO.
    legal principle
    economic reality test, also that their verbal testimony is enough to prove , plaintif can win case with their testimony
  40. MIRELES v. FRIO FOODS, INC.
    year and court
    • 1990
    • U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit
  41. MIRELES v. FRIO FOODS, INC.
    facts
    workers at a frozen food plant are delayed on the job all the time and don't get paid to wait
  42. MIRELES v. FRIO FOODS, INC.
    issue
    Does FLSA require that workers be paid for idle time on the job? Should they get full LD for this time?

    broadly: what constitutes "work" in FLSA?
  43. MIRELES v. FRIO FOODS, INC.
    holding
    • waits <15: pay
    • 15-45: pay
    • waits >45: no pay if they can leave

    discretionary, question of who it benefits primarily. engaged to be waiting (ER) vs. waiting to be engaged (EE), if EE can use time personally, they are not paid

    full LD should be awarded
  44. MIRELES v. FRIO FOODS, INC.
    reasoning
    1. discretionary, question of who it benefits primarily. engaged to be waiting (ER) vs. waiting to be engaged (EE), if EE can use time personally, they are not paid

    • time <15: too short for EEs to use to their own benefit
    • 15-45: too short for EE to use for their own benefit
    • time >45: if the EEs may leave, they should not be paid
    • -times are all case specific

    • 2. LD can be paid, but are discretionary.
    • it is the ER burden to prove they are not due if ER a. paid in good faith, AND b. had reasonable grounds for believing they were not violatinf FLSA
  45. MIRELES v. FRIO FOODS, INC.
    legal principal
    • -idle time is spent primarily for the benefit of the ER
    • + if the ER requires the EE to wait on premises
    • + if ER does not require EE to wait UNLESS time cannot be used efficiently for the EE

    engaged to be waiting (ER) v. waiting to be engaged (EE)

    • ER must prove substantial burden to not pay LD: must be in good faith and have reasonable grounds to believe they were not violating FLSA
    • -court can reduce LD
  46. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh
    year and court
    • 1998
    • Appeals for the 2nd circuit
  47. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh
    facts
  48. +Holz is a K9 officer who wants 40-44 hours of paid OT for his work with his dog
    +the judge in the first trial wrote the question as: was Holz work 1. reasonably necessary to fulfill his duties and 2. too great to accomplish within 42 hours
  49. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh
    issue
    Was the previous verdict contrary to the principals established under FLSA which would make Holz entitled to a new trial?

    boardly: what counts as compensable work as defined by FLSA?
  50. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh
    holding
    Yes, new trial and the question should have been re-written to: 1. Was the work preformed by Holz within the boundaries of what is considered compensable work under FLSA and 2. how much of this work did he do?
  51. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh
    reasoning
    • 1. the question written by the judge does not address the true issue and therefor the verdict was biased and inaccurate
    • 2. does not matter if work is "reasonably" related to the job; EE might do things that aren't reasonable but are work or things that are reasonable but not work
    • 3. also, doesn't matter if work could have been completed in 42 hours, it can still be compensable
    • 4. new question: did holz do work under FLSA? if so, how much of it is compensable under FLSA?

    • 5. to find if it is work:
    • +compensable work under FLSA is determined by whether the EE's activity is 1. controlled or required by the ER 2. is necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the ER 3. is an integral and indispensable part of the job
    • +next must decide if he engaged in that work and how much of it is compensable

    • 6. how much should be compensated for:
    • +if work was required by ER, then it is compensable
    • +if not, jury must then consider if EE acted for the benefit of the ER or for his own benefit
    • -if the time was for EE's enjoyment or wish to inflate his salary, it is not compensable
    • +benefit of EE: not compensable, benefit of ER: compensable

    7. on top of this, the ER must know or constructively know that the ER was taking part in this work
  52. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh
    dissent
    none
  53. Holzapfel v. Town of Newburgh
    legal principal
    What is compensable work:

    compensable work under FLSA is determined by whether the EE's activity is 1. controlled or required by the ER 2. is necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the ER 3. is an integral and indispensable part of the job

    • When worker should be compensated:
    • +if work was required by ER, then it is compensable
    • +if not, jury must then consider if EE acted for the benefit of the ER or for his own benefit
    • -if the time was for EE's enjoyment or wish to inflate his salary, it is not compensable
    • +benefit of EE: not compensable, benefit of ER: compensable

    on top of this, the ER must know or constructively know that the ER was taking part in this work
  54. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
    year and court
    • 1973
    • supreme court
  55. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
    facts
    green, a black race activist, thinks he was discriminated against when he was fired, participates in stall in and maybe lock in, re-applied when the position was available, didn't get the job, sueing by title VII of CRA 703(1)(a): prohibits racial discrimination in any employment decision 703(a): forbids discrimination against applicants or EEs who protest discriminatory conditions of employment

    EEOC made no finding on 703a1 but thought 704a was legit
  56. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
    issue
    is the order and allocation of proof in a private, non-class action challenging employment discrimination in accord with Title VII assurance of equality of employment opportunities to eliminate discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified environments to the disadvantage og minority citizens

    Determine the order and allocation of proof in a prima facie case of racial discrimination
  57. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
    holding
    there is a certain order and burden of proof to show dissipate treatment of a prima facie case
  58. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
    reasoning
    1. clear that title VII tolerates 0 racial discrimination

    2. important to establish the applicable rules about the burden of proof to make a prima facie case:

    3. disparate treatment (on-purpose discrimination) of a prima facie case: EE's burden to establish a prima facie case: i. that he belongs to a racial minority ii. that he applied and was qualified for a position (qualified) iii. adverse employment action dispite qualifications iv. surrounding circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination

    4. then burden shifts to ER to give a legitament and non-discriminatory reason for rejection (Green's illegal activity)

    5. then goes back to the EE to prove that the reason was pretext (false-o!), Green uses other evidence, like the treatment of EEs during work term, reaction to legitament civil rights actions, general minority employment
  59. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
    legal principal
    mcdonald douglas to show burden of proof in a dissipate prima facie discrimination case
  60. McDonnell Douglas v. Green
    dissent
    none
  61. Griggs v. Duke Power Co
    court and year
    • 1971
    • US Supreme Court
  62. Griggs v. Duke Power Co
    facts
    • Before T7, the Co.
    • openly disciminated on the basis of race in the hiring and assigning of EEs.
    • They employeed negros only in the Labor section which paid, at best, less than
    • the other sectors (where only whites were employed).

    • In 1955 company
    • instituted a policy of requiring a high school education for any department
    • except labor and for those looking to transfer into coal (next best
    • department). White EEs who were hired before this rule still go to get
    • promoted.

    • In July of 1965
    • (when T7 became effective), it became necessary to register satisfactory scores
    • on two professionally prepared aptitude tests, as well as have a high school
    • education. You still can’t transfer without high school education.

    • In September of 1965
    • you could transfer if you didn’t have a high school diploma if you passed two
    • tests: Wonderlic Personnel Test (general intelligence), Bennett Mechanical
    • Comprehension Test. Neither was directed or intended to measure job
    • performance. Had to perform at the level of the median for high school
    • transfers.
  63. Griggs v. Duke Power Co
    issue
    • Is requiring a high school
    • education or the passing of a standardized general intelligence test as a
    • condition of employment in the transfer of jobs a violation of Title VII of the
    • Civil Rights Act on 1964 when (a) neither standard is shown to be significantly
    • related to successful job performance (b) both requirements operate to
    • disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white applicants and (c)
    • the jobs in question formerly had been filled only by white employees as part
    • of a longstanding practice of giving preference to whites

    Does title 7 apply to unintentional discrimination
  64. Griggs v. Duke Power Co
    holding
    test are a violation of title 7

    title 7 protects against unintentional discrimination
  65. Griggs v. Duke Power Co
    reasoning
    • 1. clearly act prohibits any employment action that puts a minority at a disadvantage, wether intentional or unintentional
    • 2. test discriminates against blacks unintentionally
    • 3. policy seems fair in form but unfair in practice
    • 4. non of the policies are relatable to job
    • 5. there is a proof for proving disparate impact: i. EE's burden to prove an action is discriminatory in impact and in practice ii. ERs burden to show it is a business necessity (affirmative defense) iii. EEs burden to find an alternative measure with non-discriminatory results that a. examen similar skills b. is less discriminatory c. unreasonable failed to accept this alternative
  66. Griggs v. Duke Power Co
    legal principals
    • fair if it relates to the job
    • dissipate impact proof
  67. Griggs v. Duke Power Co
    dissent
    none
  68. Dothard v. Rawlinson
    year and court
    • 1977
    • US supreme court
  69. Dothard v. Rawlinson
    facts
    prison guard who didn't meet 120 pound requirement. then sued against regulation 204 which openly rejected women from position
  70. Dothard v. Rawlinson
    holding
    yes, guard is covered under bona fide occupational requirements
  71. Dothard v. Rawlinson
    reasoning
    • 1. BFOQ are very narrow
    • 2. however, there is substantial proof that a woman would be unfit and unsafe to work as a gaurd
    • 3. being male is a BFOQ for this position
  72. Dothard v. Rawlinson
    legal principal
    when the sex of an EE can be directly related to a substantial secuirty threat a BFOQ can be applide under 703e of title7.
  73. Dothard v. Rawlinson
    dissent
    • 1. agrees that BFOQ should be narrow
    • 2. notes that some women are unfit for this job, like some men, it is possible for a woman to be suitable and just because the average woman is not, there is not fair grounds for discrimination
    • 3. guards don't rely on their ability to fend off prisoners anyways
  74. Dothard v. Rawlinson
    issue
    what constitutes bona fide occupational qualifications? is it legal to discriminate on the basis of gender by 703e of Title7 CRA?

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