psc 303 final

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  1. bush vs. gore
    • Did the Florida Supreme Court violate Article II Section 1 Clause 2 of
    • the U.S. Constitution by making new election law? Do standardless manual
    • recounts violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the
    • Constitution?
    • Noting that the Equal Protection clause guarantees individuals that
    • their ballots cannot be devalued by "later arbitrary and disparate
    • treatment," the per curiam opinion held 7-2 that the Florida Supreme
    • Court's scheme for recounting ballots was unconstitutional. Even if the
    • recount was fair in theory, it was unfair in practice. The record
    • suggested that different standards were applied from ballot to ballot,
    • precinct to precinct, and county to county. Because of those and other
    • procedural difficulties, the court held that no constitutional recount
    • could be fashioned in the time remaining (which was short because the
    • Florida legislature wanted to take advantage of the "safe harbor"
    • provided by 3 USC Section 5). Loathe to make broad precedents, the per
    • curiam opinion limited its holding to the present case. Rehnquist (in a
    • concurring opinion joined by Scalia and Thomas) argued that the recount
    • scheme was also unconstitutional because the Florida Supreme Court's
    • decision made new election law, which only the state legislature may do.
    • Breyer and Souter (writing separately) agreed with the per curiam
    • holding that the Florida Court's recount scheme violated the Equal
    • Protection Clause, but they dissented with respect to the remedy,
    • believing that a constitutional recount could be fashioned. Time is
    • insubstantial when constitutional rights are at stake. Ginsburg and
    • Stevens (writing separately) argued that for reasons of federalism, the
    • Florida Supreme Court's decision ought to be respected. Moreover, the
    • Florida decision was fundamentally right; the Constitution requires that
    • every vote be counted.
  2. in re neagle
    Facts of the Case


    • Suspecting a plot against Justice Stephen J.
    • Field's life, the U.S. Attorney General appointed Neagle, a U.S.
    • Marshall, to protect him. Acting as Field's bodyguard, Neagle shot and
    • killed a man who appeared about to attack the justice. After California
    • officials arrested and jailed Neagle, the U.S. sought his release by a
    • writ of habeas corpus.






    Question


    • Was the state obligated to obey the writ even
    • though no national statute empowered the Attorney General to provide
    • judges with bodyguards?






    Conclusion
















    • Yes. The Court held that the Attorney General
    • acted appropriately since assigning Neagle as Field's bodyguard assured
    • that the nation's laws would be faithfully executed. Furthermore,
    • Neagle's actions were consistent with a congressional statute which
    • provided U.S. Marshalls with "the same powers, in executing the laws" as
    • state sheriffs and deputies (who would have been allowed to deter an
    • attack on Field's life).
  3. clinton vs. new york
    • This case consolidates two separate challenges to the constitutionality
    • of two cancellations, made by President William J. Clinton, under the
    • Line Item Veto Act ("Act"). In the first, the City of New York, two
    • hospital associations, a hospital, and two health care unions,
    • challenged the President's cancellation of a provision in the Balanced
    • Budget Act of 1997 which relinquished the Federal Government's ability
    • to recoup nearly $2.6 billion in taxes levied against Medicaid providers
    • by the State of New York.

    Question


    • Did the President's ability to selectively cancel
    • individual portions of bills, under the Line Item Veto Act, violate the
    • Presentment Clause of Article I?
    • Yes. In a 6-to-3 decision the Court first established that both the City
    • of New York, and its affiliates, and the farmers' cooperative suffered
    • sufficiently immediate and concrete injuries to sustain their standing
    • to challenge the President's actions. The Court then explained that
    • under the Presentment Clause, legislation that passes both Houses of
    • Congress must either be entirely approved (i.e. signed) or rejected
    • (i.e. vetoed) by the President. The Court held that by canceling only
    • selected portions of the bills at issue, under authority granted him by
    • the Act, the President in effect "amended" the laws before him. Such
    • discretion, the Court concluded, violated the "finely wrought"
    • legislative procedures of Article I as envisioned by the Framers.
  4. morrison v. olson
    Facts of the Case


    • The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 created a
    • special court and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that
    • court the appointment of an "independent counsel" to investigate, and,
    • if necessary, prosecute government officials for certain violations of
    • federal criminal laws.






    Question


    Did the Act violate the constitutional principal of separation of powers?

    • The Court addressed a number of constitutional issues in this case and
    • upheld the law. The near-unanimous Court held that the means of
    • selecting the independent counsel did not violate the Appointments
    • Clause; the powers allocated to the special court did not violate
    • Article III; and the Act was not offensive to the separation of powers
    • doctrine since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of
    • the Executive Branch.
  5. myers v United states
    • he Ethics in Government
    • Act of 1978 (aka the Independent
    • Counsel Act) created a special court
    • and empowered the Attorney General to recommend to that court the
    • appointment of an independent counsel to investigate, and
    • prosecute government officials for certain violations of Federal criminal
    • laws.An independent counsel could not be fired except for cause.The appointment was not by
    • the President, and was not subject to the approval of Congress.And independent counsel was appointed to investigate Olson. Olson
    • argued that the Ethics in Government Act was
    • unconstitutional.Olsen argued that that the independent
    • counsel violated the Appointments
    • Clause because it was an executive
    • branch office that was not appointed by the President.In addition, it was a violation
    • of Article III and the separation of powers doctrine because it gave
    • judicial powers to a court created by the executive branch. It was sort of a hybrid
    • "fourth branch" of government that was ultimately answerable
    • to no one.Olsen argued that the broad
    • powers of the independent counsel
    • could be easily abused, or corrupted by partisanship.The US Supreme Court found the
    • Ethics in Government Act to be
    • constitutional.The US Supreme Court found
    • that the means of selecting the independent counsel did not violate the
    • Appointments Clause, Article III, or the separation of powers doctrine
    • since it did not impermissibly interfere with the functions of the
    • Executive Branch.Since the independent
    • counsel was an inferior officer, his
    • appointment did not have to come from the President.Since the independent
    • counsel could only be fired for
    • cause, subject to judicial review, it's a pretty secure position. The
    • President can fire the Attorney General at will. So, it could be argued
    • that the independent counsel
    • was a principle officer, and should only be appointed by the President.The Court felt that the Act
    • did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by increasing the power
    • of one branch at the expense of another. Instead, even though the
    • President could not directly fire the independent counsel, the person holding that office was still an
    • Executive Branch officer, not under the control of either Congress or the
    • Courts.
  6. Humphryes executor v. United states
    Facts of the Case


    • President Hoover appointed, and the Senate
    • confirmed, Humphrey as a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission
    • (FTC). In 1933, President Roosevelt asked for Humphrey's resignation
    • since the latter was a conservative and had jurisdiction over many of
    • Roosevelt's New Deal policies. When Humphrey refused to resign,
    • Roosevelt fired him because of his policy positions. However, the FTC
    • Act only allowed a president to remove a commissioner for "inefficiency,
    • neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office." Since Humphrey died shortly
    • after being dismissed, his executor sued to recover Humphrey's lost
    • salary.






    Question


    Did section 1 of the Federal Trade Commission Act unconstitutionally interfere with the executive power of the President?






    Conclusion








    • Decision: 9 votes for Humphrey's Executor, 0 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: US Const Art 1 and 2; Federal Trade Commission Act









    • The unanimous Court found that the FTC Act was
    • constitutional and that Humphrey's dismissal on policy grounds was
    • unjustified. The Court reasoned that the Constitution had never given
    • "illimitable power of removal" to the president. Justice Sutherland
    • dismissed the government's main line of defense in this case which
    • relied heavily on the Court's decision in Meyers v. United States
    • (1926). In that case the Court upheld the president's right to remove
    • officers who were "units of the executive department." The FTC was
    • different, argued Sutherland, because it was a body created by Congress
    • to perform quasi- legislative and judicial functions. The Meyers
    • precedent, therefore, did not apply in this situation.
  7. United States v. Nixon
    Facts of the Case


    • A grand jury returned indictments against seven
    • of President Richard Nixon's closest aides in the Watergate affair. The
    • special prosecutor appointed by Nixon and the defendants sought audio
    • tapes of conversations recorded by Nixon in the Oval Office. Nixon
    • asserted that he was immune from the subpoena claiming "executive
    • privilege," which is the right to withhold information from other
    • government branches to preserve confidential communications within the
    • executive branch or to secure the national interest. Decided together
    • with Nixon v. United States.






    Question


    • Is the President's right to safeguard certain
    • information, using his "executive privilege" confidentiality power,
    • entirely immune from judicial review?

    • No. The Court held that neither the doctrine of separation of powers,
    • nor the generalized need for confidentiality of high-level
    • communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified,
    • presidential privilege. The Court granted that there was a limited
    • executive privilege in areas of military or diplomatic affairs, but gave
    • preference to "the fundamental demands of due process of law in the
    • fair administration of justice." Therefore, the president must obey the
    • subpoena and produce the tapes and documents. Nixon resigned shortly
    • after the release of the tapes.
  8. Mississippi v. Johnson
    Facts of the Case


    • In 1867, Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts.
    • Although President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Acts, Congress overrode
    • the veto. In an attempt to delay or prevent Reconstruction, the state of
    • Mississippi appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Mississippi asked
    • the Court for an injunction preventing the President from enforcing the
    • Acts on the ground that they were unconstitutional.






    Question


    Could the Supreme Court constitutionally issue an injunction directed against the President?






    Conclusion
















    • In a unanimous decision, the Court held that it
    • had "no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the
    • performance of his official duties...." The Court held that the duties
    • of the President as required by the Reconstruction Acts were "in no
    • sense ministerial," and that a judicial attempt to interfere with the
    • performance of such duties would be "an absurd and excessive
    • extravagance." The Court noted that if the President chose to ignore the
    • injunction, the judiciary would be unable to enforce the order.
  9. Nixon v. fitzgerald
    Facts of the Case


    • In 1968, Fitzgerald, then a civilian analyst with
    • the United States Air Force, testified before a congressional committee
    • about inefficiencies and cost overruns in the production of the C-5A
    • transport plane. Roughly one year later he was fired, an action for
    • which President Nixon took responsibility. Fitzgerald then sued Nixon
    • for damages after the Civil Service Commission concluded that his
    • dismissal was unjust.






    Question


    Was the President immune from prosecution in a civil suit?

    • Yes. The Court held that the President "is entitled to absolute immunity
    • from damages liability predicated on his official acts." This sweeping
    • immunity, argued Justice Powell, was a function of the "President's
    • unique office, rooted in the constitutional tradition of separation of
    • powers and supported by our history."
  10. Clinton v. Jones
    Facts of the Case


    • Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton.
    • She alleged that while she was an Arkansas state employee, she suffered
    • several "abhorrent" sexual advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton.
    • Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's advances
    • ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a
    • District Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to
    • the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior request to have
    • the suit dismissed on grounds of presidential immunity, Clinton sought
    • to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit against him.
    • While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the judge
    • ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's
    • Presidency. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial
    • but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it would be a "functional
    • equivalent" to an unlawful grant of temporary presidential immunity.






    Question


    • Is a serving President, for separation of powers
    • reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil litigation arising out
    • of events which transpired prior to his taking office?

    • No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the Constitution does
    • not grant a sitting President immunity from civil litigation except
    • under highly unusual circumstances. After noting the great respect and
    • dignity owed to the Executive office, the Court held that neither
    • separation of powers nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
    • information can justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from
    • judicial process. While the independence of our government's branches
    • must be protected under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
    • Constitution does not prohibit these branches from exercising any
    • control over one another. This, the Court added, is true despite the
    • procedural burdens which Article III jurisdiction may impose on the
    • time, attention, and resources of the Chief Executive.
  11. Ex parte grossman
    Facts of the Case


    • In 1920, legal action was taken against Philip
    • Grossman for selling liquor at his place of business in violation of the
    • National Prohibition Act. He violated a federal court injunction by
    • continuing to sell alcoholic beverages. He was found guilty of criminal
    • contempt of court and sentenced to one year in prison and a $1,000 fine.
    • In 1923, President Calvin Coolidge issued a pardon that reduced
    • Grossman's sentence to payment of the fine.






    Question


    Did the president have the constitutional authority to commute a sentence for criminal contempt of court?






    Conclusion
















    • In a unanimous decision, the Court found that a
    • presidential pardon for a criminal contempt of court sentence was within
    • the powers of the executive. There is nothing in the words "offenses
    • against the United States" that excludes criminal contempts in the
    • Constitution. Actions that violate the dignity or authority of the
    • federal courts violate the law of the United States, making these
    • contempts offenses against the United States. The president's pardon
    • authority includes such offenses. Without destroying the deterrent
    • effect of judicial punishment, the president's powers are to act as
    • checks against undue prejudice or needless severity in such sentencing
    • by the judicial branch.
  12. Murphy v. Ford
  13. United States v. Curtis
  14. the prize cases
    Facts of the Case


    • Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of southern ports
    • in April 1861. Congress authorized him to declare a state of
    • insurrection by the Act of July 13, 1861. By the Act of August 6, 1861,
    • Congress retroactively ratified all Lincoln's military action. These
    • cases involved the seizure of vessels bound for Confederate ports prior
    • to July 13, 1861.






    Question


    Did Lincoln act within his presidential powers defined by Article II when he ordered the seizures absent a declaration of war?






    Conclusion








    • Decision: 5 votes for United States, 4 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: US Const. Art 2









    • The President had the power to act. A state of
    • civil war existed de facto after the firing on Fort Sumter (April 12,
    • 1861) and the Supreme Court would take this fact into account. Though
    • neither Congress nor the President can declare war against a state of
    • the Union, when states waged war against the United States government,
    • the President was "bound to meet it in the shape it presented
    • itself,without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name."
  15. ex parte milligan
    Facts of the Case


    • Lambden P. Milligan was sentenced to death by a
    • military commission in Indiana during the Civil War; he had engaged in
    • acts of disloyalty. Milligan sought release through habeas corpus from a
    • federal court.






    Question


    Does a civil court have jurisdiction over a military tribunal?






    Conclusion








    • Decision: 9 votes for Milligan, 0 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: US Const. Amend 5









    • Davis, speaking for the Court, held that trials
    • of civilians by presidentially created military commissions are
    • unconstitutional. Martial law cannot exist where the civil courts are
    • operating.
  16. ex parte quirin
    Question


    • Did the President exceed his authority in
    • ordering a trial by military commission for the German saboteurs,
    • thereby violating their rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments?






    Conclusion
















    • No. In a unanimous opinion authored by Chief
    • Justice Harlan Fisk Stone, the Court concluded that the conspirators, as
    • spies without uniform whose purpose was sabotage, violated the law of
    • war and were therefore unlawful enemy combatants. Noting that Congress
    • had, under the Articles of War, authorized trial by military commission
    • for unlawful enemy combatants, the Court therefore determined that the
    • President had not exceeded his power. Furthermore, the Court asserted
    • that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments "did not enlarge the right to jury
    • trial" beyond those cases where it was understood by the framers to have
    • been appropriate. Therefore, because the amendments cannot be read "as
    • either abolishing all trials by military tribunals, save those of the
    • personnel of our own armed forces, or, what in effect comes to the same
    • thing, as imposing on all such tribunals the necessity of proceeding
    • against unlawful enemy belligerents only on presentment and trial by
    • jury," the rights of the conspirators were not violated.
  17. korematsu v. US
    Facts of the Case


    • During World War II, Presidential Executive Order
    • 9066 and congressional statutes gave the military authority to exclude
    • citizens of Japanese ancestry from areas deemed critical to national
    • defense and potentially vulnerable to espionage. Korematsu remained in
    • San Leandro, California and violated Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 of
    • the U.S. Army.






    Question


    • Did the President and Congress go beyond their
    • war powers by implementing exclusion and restricting the rights of
    • Americans of Japanese descent?






    Conclusion








    • Decision: 6 votes for United States, 3 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: Executive Order 9066; U.S. Const. amend. 5









    • The Court sided with the government and held that
    • the need to protect against espionage outweighed Korematsu's rights.
    • Justice Black argued that compulsory exclusion, though constitutionally
    • suspect, is justified during circumstances of "emergency and peril."
  18. youngstown sheet and tube v. sawyer
    Facts of the Case


    • In April of 1952, during the Korean War,
    • President Truman issued an executive order directing Secretary of
    • Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize and operate most of the nation's steel
    • mills. This was done in order to avert the expected effects of a strike
    • by the United Steelworkers of America.






    Question


    Did the President have the constitutional authority to seize and operate the steel mills?






    Conclusion








    • Decision: 6 votes for Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 3 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: US Const. Art. II









    • In a 6-to-3 decision, the Court held that the
    • President did not have the authority to issue such an order. The Court
    • found that there was no congressional statute that authorized the
    • President to take possession of private property. The Court also held
    • that the President's military power as Commander in Chief of the Armed
    • Forces did not extend to labor disputes. The Court argued that "the
    • President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes
    • the idea that he is to be a lawmaker."
  19. Dames and morre vs. regan
    Facts of the Case


    • In reaction to the seizure of the U.S. embassy
    • and American nationals in Iran, President Jimmy Carter invoked the
    • International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and froze Iranian
    • assets in the United States. When the hostages were released in 1981,
    • Treasury Secretary Donald Regan affirmed the agreements made the Carter
    • administration that terminated all legal proceedings against the Iranian
    • government and created an independent Claims Tribunal. Dames &
    • Moore attempted to recover over $3 million owed to it by the Iranian
    • government and claimed the executive orders were beyond the scope of
    • presidential power.






    Question


    • Did the president have the authority to transfer Iranian funds and to nullify legal claims against Iran?
    • The Court held that the International Emergency Economic Powers Act
    • constituted a specific congressional authorization for the President to
    • order the transfer of Iranian assets. The Court further held that
    • although the IEEPA itself did not authorize the presidential suspension
    • of legal claims, previous acts of Congress had "implicitly approved" of
    • executive control of claim settlement. The Court emphasized the
    • narrowness of its ruling, limiting the decision to the facts of the
    • case.
  20. hamdan vs. rumsfield
    Facts of the Case


    • Salim Ahmed Hamdan, Osama bin Laden's former
    • chauffeur, was captured by Afghani forces and imprisoned by the U.S.
    • military in Guantanamo Bay. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas
    • corpus in federal district court to challenge his detention. Before the
    • district court ruled on the petition, he received a hearing from a
    • military tribunal, which designated him an enemy combatant.
    • A few months later, the district court granted Hamdan's habeas
    • petition, ruling that he must first be given a hearing to determine
    • whether he was a prisoner of war under the Geneva Convention before he
    • could be tried by a military commission. The Circuit Court of Appeals
    • for the District of Columbia reversed the decision, however, finding
    • that the Geneva Convention could not be enforced in federal court and
    • that the establishment of military tribunals had been authorized by
    • Congress and was therefore not unconstitutional.






    Question


    • May the rights protected by the Geneva Convention
    • be enforced in federal court through habeas corpus petitions? Was the
    • military commission established to try Hamdan and others for alleged war
    • crimes in the War on Terror authorized by the Congress or the inherent
    • powers of the President?









    • Decision: 5 votes for Hamdan, 3 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: Uniform Code of Military Justice









    • Yes and no. The Supreme Court, in a 5-to-3
    • decision authored by Justice John Paul Stevens, held that neither an act
    • of Congress nor the inherent powers of the Executive laid out in the
    • Constitution expressly authorized the sort of military commission at
    • issue in this case. Absent that express authorization, the commission
    • had to comply with the ordinary laws of the United States and the laws
    • of war. The Geneva Convention, as a part of the ordinary laws of war,
    • could therefore be enforced by the Supreme Court, along with the
    • statutory Uniform Code of Military Justice. Hamdan's exclusion from
    • certain parts of his trial deemed classified by the military commission
    • violated both of these, and the trial was therefore illegal. Justices
    • Scalia, Thomas, and Alito dissented. Chief Justice John Roberts, who
    • participated in the case while serving on the DC Circuit Court of
    • Appeals, did not take part in the decision.
  21. Mcculloch v. maryland
  22. Scott vs. Sanford
    Facts of the Case


    • Dred Scott was a slave in Missouri. From 1833 to
    • 1843, he resided in Illinois (a free state) and in an area of the
    • Louisiana Territory, where slavery was forbidden by the Missouri
    • Compromise of 1820. After returning to Missouri, Scott sued
    • unsuccessfully in the Missouri courts for his freedom, claiming that his
    • residence in free territory made him a free man. Scott then brought a
    • new suit in federal court. Scott's master maintained that no
    • pure-blooded Negro of African descent and the descendant of slaves could
    • be a citizen in the sense of Article III of the Constitution.






    Question


    Was Dred Scott free or slave?






    Conclusion








    • Decision: 7 votes for Sandford, 2 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: US Const. Amend. 5; Missouri Compromise









    • Dred Scott was a slave. Under Articles III and
    • IV, argued Taney, no one but a citizen of the United States could be a
    • citizen of a state, and that only Congress could confer national
    • citizenship. Taney reached the conclusion that no person descended from
    • an American slave had ever been a citizen for Article III purposes. The
    • Court then held the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional, hoping to end
    • the slavery question once and for all.
  23. Hammer vs. Dagenhart
    Facts of the Case


    • The Keating-Owen Child Labor Act prohibited the
    • interstate shipment of goods produced by child labor. Reuben Dagenhart's
    • father had sued on behalf of his freedom to allow his fourteen year old
    • son to work in a textile mill.






    Question


    Does the congressional act violate the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, or the Fifth Amendment?






    Conclusion








    • Decision: 5 votes for Dagenhart, 4 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: US Const. Art 1, Section 8, Clause 3; US Const. Amend 10; Keating-Owen Act of 1916









    • Day spoke for the Court majority and found two
    • grounds to invalidate the law. Production was not commerce, and thus
    • outside the power of Congress to regulate. And the regulation of
    • production was reserved by the Tenth Amendment to the states. Day wrote
    • that "the powers not expressly delegated to the national government are
    • reserved" to the states and to the people. In his wording, Day revised
    • the Constitution slightly and changed the intent of the framers: The
    • Tenth Amendment does not say "expressly." The framers purposely left the
    • word expressly out of the amendment because they believed they could
    • not possibly specify every power that might be needed in the future to
    • run the governme
  24. national league of cities v. usery
    Facts of the Case


    • In 1974, Congress passed amendments to the Fair
    • Labor Standards Act of 1938. The purpose of the amendments was to
    • regulate minimum wage and overtime pay for state and local government
    • employees. The National League of Cities, as well as several states and
    • cities, challenged the constitutionality of the amendments.






    Question


    • May Congress, acting under its commerce power,
    • regulate the labor market of state employees, which the Tenth Amendment
    • reserves to the states?





    • Argument
    • National League of Cities v. Usery - Oral ArgumentNational League of Cities v. Usery - Opinion AnnouncementNational League of Cities v. Usery - Oral Reargument


    Conclusion








    • Decision: 5 votes for National League of Cities, 4 vote(s) against
    • Legal provision: Article 1, Section 8, Paragraph 3: Interstate Commerce Clause









    • Congress may not regulate the labor market of
    • state employees. The Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting
    • legislation which operates "to directly displace the States' freedom to
    • structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
    • functions." While the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause is
    • "plenary," that power has constitutional limits. In this case, the
    • exercise of the commerce power ran afoul of the Tenth Amendment which
    • protects the states' traditional activities.
  25. garcia v. San antoonio metropolitical transit
  26. new york v united states
  27. printz s. united States
  28. alden v. maine
  29. gibbons vs. ogden
  30. united states v. Knight
  31. stafford vs. wallace
  32. poultry corp v. united states
  33. carter vs. coal company
  34. national labor relations board v jones and steel company
  35. United states vs. Darby
  36. Wickard vs, Fillburn
  37. United states v. lopez
  38. united state v. morrison
  39. Gonzales v. Raich

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