PCIS

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Author:
heidin
ID:
144211
Filename:
PCIS
Updated:
2012-03-27 14:46:33
Tags:
ILC PCIS
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Description:
questions- open ended and multiple choice
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  1. What general classification (i.e., A, B, or C) are the following Primary Containment penetrations:

    RHR Shutdown Cooling suction?

    RCIC torus suction?

    RBCCW to the drywell?

    Pneumatics to the drywell?
    RHR Shutdown Cooling suction = Group A

    RCIC torus suction = Group B

    RBCCW to the drywell = Group C

    Pneumatics to the drywell? = Group B (supply line to non-safety related equipment are non-safety related and considered to communicate with containment atmosphere)
  2. What are the bases for the following MSIV closures:

    Low Level 3?

    High steam flow 30% (Not in Run – Unit 2 only)?

    Low condenser vacuum?

    Low steam line pressure (Run)?
    Low Level 3-- Indicates capability to cool fuel may be threatened and prevents off-site dose limits from being exceeded

    High steam flow 30%-- Prevents excessive depressurization on EHC failure (required only on Unit 2 with its ≈70% bypass capability)

    Low condenser vacuum-- Protects condenser from overpressure since condenser integrity is assumed by off-site dose calculations (Alternative Source Term – 10CFR50.67)

    Low steam line pressure (Run)-- Based on EHC system failure, protects against low RPV level due to inventory loss, excessive cool-down rate and possible safety limit violation (Thermal power must be <23% rated when RPV pressure <785 psig)
  3. Which group 1 isolation valves must have their control switches in CLOSE to completely reset Group 1 isolation logic?
    All eight MSIVs and both Recirc Sample valves
  4. What is the minimum number of Main Steam Line temperature elements that would cause:


    MSIV closure?

    Full Group 1 isolation (excluding Recirc sample valves)?
    MSIV closure-- 2 (any TE in A1 or A2 plus any TE in B1 or B2)

    Full Group 1 isolation (excluding Recirc sample valves)-- 4 (one in each trip channel) to get both Inboard and Outboard drain valves closed
  5. How will Group 1 (MSIV and sample) valves respond to:


    Loss of RPS MG set A?

    Loss of 480 VAC Substation E7?

    Loss of RPS Channel A1 and A2 analog trip cabinets?

    Loss of Division I 125/250 VDC?
    Loss of RPS MG set A-- ½ MSIV closure signal and closure of Inboard Steam Line Drain and Inboard Recirc Sample Valve

    Loss of 480 VAC Substation E7-- ½ MSIV closure signal and closure of Inboard Recirc Sample Valve. Inboard Steam Line Drain gets close signal due to loss of RPS A, but does not have power to close

    • Loss of RPS Channel A1 and A2 analog trip cabinets-- ½ MSIV closure signal but no valve movement due to logic arrangement (A1 in Inboard logic, A2 in Outboard logic)
    • Loss of Division I 125/250 VDC-- Inboard MSIV close (Loss of RPS analog trip cabinets A1 and A2 cause ½ closure signal from PCIS channels A1 and A2 which de-energizes the Inboard AC solenoid and the Outboard DC solenoid. The Inboard DC solenoid is directly powered from Div. I DC and de-energizes) Note: If operating at power when the DC loss occurs, Outboard MSIVs will close shortly after Inboard MSIVs close due to low steam line pressure
  6. Which Group 2 (TIPs and Floor/Equipment Drains) valves have override capability by circuitry design? Why these valves?
    RHR Heat Exchanger Sample valves. This allows for post accident sampling of torus water (or RPV water if in Shutdown Cooling) to determine extent of core damage
  7. Which Group 2 (TIPs and Floor/Equipment Drains) isolation is associated with Inboard isolation logic only?
    TIP Ball valves
  8. Which automatic Group 2 (TIPs and Floor/Equipment Drains) isolation valves are NOT Tech Spec required PCIVs?
    RHR to Radwaste and RHR Sample valves
  9. Which Group 3 (RWCU) signal(s):

    Result in partial isolation only?

    Is/are not required by Tech Specs?
    SLC initiation and NRHX outlet high temperature close the Outboard valve only (F004).

    NRHX outlet high temperature is for equipment protection (filter demins) only, not Tech Spec related.
  10. How will group 3 (RWCU) valves respond to:

    A loss of 480 VAC Substation E7?

    A loss of 480 VAC Substation E8?
    Loss of Div I: Both Inboard and Outboard valves receive isolation signal (Inboard from loss of RPS A, Outboard from de-energizing NRHX outlet temperature switch) however only the Outboard valve (Div II DC) closes. The Inboard valve (Div I AC) has lost power

    Loss of Div II: Both Inboard and Outboard valves receive isolation signal (Outboard for several reasons including loss of RPS B, Inboard due to loss of Div II steam leak detection NUMAC which supplies Δ Flow input to both Inboard & Outboard logics). Both valves have power available to close
  11. How will loss of AC power affect HPCI isolation capability?
    HPCI maintains isolation capability for all isolation signals except for steam leak detection, from the NUMACs (which are powered from 120 VAC E Bus power)
  12. How will the operator know during reactor pressurization that pressure has gone above the HPCI low pressure isolation reset value?
    Low pressure switches open and de-energize low pressure isolation relays which do not seal in. The reset of the isolation relays will de-energize the HPCI turbine trip solenoid and clear the HPCI TURB TRIP SOL ENER (A-01 4-1) alarm
  13. What RCIC MOVs are Tech Spec required PCIVs?
    E51-F007 and F008 (steam supply isolation) and E51-F031 (inboard torus suction) are Group 5 PCIVs required by Tech Spec. E51-F029 (outboard torus suction) is a Group 5 PCIV but is not required by Tech Spec (since we take credit for the water seal). E51-F062 and 66 (exhaust vacuum breaker isolations) are Group 9 PCIVs and are required by Tech Specs.

    Other RCIC MOVs that are not automatic but are Tech Spec required PCIVs are E51-F013 (injection valve), and E51-F019 (min flow valve).
  14. What single power supply losses (be specific – two required) will cause a Group 6 isolation on both units
    Loss of UPS (normally Unit 2 UPS) will de-energize stack radiation monitor and cause isolation on both units. Loss of 120 VAC panel 32AB (Normally from E7) will de-energize main stack radiation monitor trip relay (3-55) for both units and cause isolation
  15. With the unit at normal full power conditions, what indication would you have above the respective override switch (red, green, neither, or both) if:

    The CAC “soft” override switches are placed to Override (and then allowed to spring return to Neutral)?

    The CAM “hard” override switches are placed to Override?
    Soft: Green off, Red on – no isolation signal present so soft override relay will energize

    Hard: Red and Green both on, Red since switch is in Override position, Green since there is no isolation signal present
  16. From where does the high drywell pressure input to Group 7/9 isolation logic come from?
    From Core Spray initiation logic via ECCS analog trip cabinets
  17. With RHR Loop A in Shutdown Cooling, how will the RHR Loop respond to:

    Loss of RPS Bus A?

    Loss of RPS Bus B?
    Inboard isolation valve (E11-F009) and LPCI injection valve (E11-F015A) both close (and the running RHR pump trips on no suction path)

    (Outboard isolation valve (E11-F008) closes (and the running RHR pump trips on no suction path) E11-F015A remains open
  18. How will an inadvertent initiation of Core Spray Loop B affect pneumatics to the drywell?
    Both divisions of RNA to the drywell isolate and both divisions of Backup Nitrogen open

    since Inboard MSIVs lose continuous pneumatic supply and will drift close once the accumulators deplete, the APP for Core Spray System Actuated [A-03 2-6] allows overriding the RNA valves open on a faulty initiation signal
  19. What isolations (by Group) will occur:

    On a Loss of Off-Site Power (LOOP)?

    On a Design Bases Accident (DBA) large break LOCA?
    LOOP-- 1, 2, 3, 6, 8 & 10

    1, 2, 3, 6, & 8 from loss of RPS,

    Group 10 only because of loss of solenoid power – see auto actions of AOP-36.1. AOP-36.1 supplementary actions direct re-opening Group 10 valves early into the event)

    LOCA-- Groups 1-10 (all). Level drops below TAF, high drywell pressure, and RPV depressurized
  20. What DC powered isolation logic(s) is/are normally energized and de-energize to cause isolation?
    Group 6 DC powered isolation logic (for DC powered CAD injection path and drywell head vent)
  21. For the four temperature switches (B21-TS-N010A-D) located in the MSIV Pit, what is
    the trip logic arrangement that would cause a closure of the Main Steam Isolation
    Valves (MSIVs) to close due to high MSIV Pit temperature?


    A. A1 or A2 and B1 or B2. This isolation occurs at 175°F.
    B. A1 or A2 and B1 or B2. This isolation occurs at 190°F.
    C. A1 and B1 or A2 and B2. This isolation occurs at 175°F.
    D. A1 and B1 or A2 and B2. This isolation occurs at 190°F.
    B. A1 or A2 and B1 or B2. This isolation occurs at 190°F.


    The MSIV closure is channels A1 or A2 and B1 or B2. Inboard drain line isolation is A1 and B1. Outboard drain line isolation is A2 and B2. The alarm setpoint is 175°F, theisolation at 190°F.
  22. During an accident on Unit Two, suppression chamber venting is aligned to control primary containment pressure per SEP-01. The flowpath is through SBGT via the small torus vent path (CAC-V172 & V22).

    Plant conditions when the flowpath was established:
    Reactor level +200 inches
    Drywell pressure 55 psig
    Process Rx Bldg Vent Rad Hi-Hi Alarm sealed in (UA-03 3-5)
    Rx Bldg Vent Temp High Has not alarmed (UA-03 6-2)
    Process OG Vent Pipe Rad Hi-Hi Has not alarmed (UA-03 5-4)
    Process Off-Gas Rad Hi-Hi Has not alarmed (UA-03 4-2)

    Which one of the following conditions would automatically isolate the vent path?

    A. Reactor level drops to +150".
    B. Rx Bldg Vent Temp High alarms.
    C. Process Off-Gas Rad Hi-Hi alarms.
    D. Process OG Vent Pipe Rad Hi-Hi alarms.
    A. Reactor level drops to +150".


    SEP-01, Section 1 for pressure control directs using the four CAC soft override switches to override the isolation for CAC·V22 and V172. These are soft overrides in that a subsequent isolation signal would reclose the valves. Main stack Rad (process OG vent pipe) Hi-Hi is a subsequent isolation signal, but SEP-01 also directs placing CAC-CS-5519 (hard override for main stack) to override. Rx Bldg vent temp hi is also an isolation signal but is not subsequent per the logic since Rx Bldg vent Rad Hi-Hi already in. Process OG Rad (SJAE) is not group 6 isolation but is easily confused with OG vent pipe. Since LL1 is an isolation, level dropping to +'50 will cause valves to close.
  23. Unit Two is performing heatup and pressurization of the Reactor. Mechanical Vacuum Pumps are in operation to establish condenser vacuum. A control rod drop accident occurs resulting in the following Radiation Monitor status:

    Main Steam line Rad Hi trip on channels A, B, C, & D
    Main Steam Line Rad Hi-Hi trip on channels A & D only
    Control Building Vent Air Intake Plenum Channel 2 @ 6 mr/hr
    Control Building Vent Air Intake Plenum Channel 3 @ 8 mr/hr

    What automatic action(s), if any, is(are) expected to occur?

    A. No automatic actions are expected to occur.
    B. Mechanical Vacuum Pumps isolate and trip only.
    C. Control Building HVAC initiates in the radiation protection mode only.
    D. Mechanical Vacuum Pumps isolate and trip, and Control Building HVAC initiates in the radiation protection mode.
    D. Mechanical Vacuum Pumps isolate and trip, and Control Building HVAC initiates in the radiation protection mode.


    MSL Rad Hi-Hi (not Hi) isolates and trips vacuum pumps. The logic is 1 out of 2 twice(A or C plus B or D). Since the 1 of 2 twice is satisfied, the vacuum pumps trip. Either channel of control building intake reading >7 mr/hr will initiate CREV.
  24. Unit Two heatup and pressurization is in progress per GP-02.

    All MSIVs are open. The Inboard (B21-F016) and Outboard (B21-F019) drain line isolation valves are open.

    How will the main steam system respond to a loss of RPS MG Set B?
    The DC solenoid on the Inboard MSIVs and the AC solenoid on the Outboard MSIVs de-energize. B21-F019 closes.

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