Cooperation and Conflict

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memericle2
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Cooperation and Conflict
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2013-03-24 11:46:24
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psychology cooperation conflict
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Final exam review
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  1. What is the definition of conflict?
    When one party believes the other has or will negatively effect something the other party cares about.
  2. What is the definition of negotiation?
    A discussion with the aim of resolving conflict over incompatible goals or interests.
  3. Mixed-motive situations
    motive to compete (mind own interests) and cooperate (collaborate)
  4. Bargaining zone
    range of options for negotiators
  5. Negative bargaining zone
    Area in between buyer and seller's resistance points, no overlap, so negotiation is impossible.
  6. Distributive negotiation
    compromise on each issue, middle of everything, not always the most effective solution
  7. Integrative negotiation
    • logrolling-- exchanging concessions on different issues
    • expanding the pie-- making the negotiation larger, adding issues
    • free exchange of information, trial-and-error
  8. Joint outcome
    • used as measure of agreement quality
    • higher joint=more likely for overall happiness and satisfaction
  9. What are the types of outcomes?
    • win-win
    • win-lose
    • compromise
    • impasse (no agreement)
  10. Pareto efficiency
    • outcome quality measure: outcome is pareto efficient when every other option is worse for at least one of the parties
    • pareto efficient does not mean fair or equal
  11. Dual Concern Model
  12. Which outcomes are distribute and integrative negotiation behaviors associated with?
    • distributive: win-lose, compromise, impasse
    • integrative: win-win
  13. Are there more impasses in low pressure or high pressure negotiations?
    low pressure
  14. What behaviors does a early impasse lead to?
    A switch from low integration to high integration, but only when interests and not values are involved.
  15. Which has higher joint outcomes: interest or value negotiations?
    Interest negotiations
  16. Interest negotiation
    Conflicting positions based on interest in money, benefit, time, etc.
  17. Value negotiation
    Conflict over a problem with no one right answer, each party has a different ideal
  18. Differentiation-before-integration pattern
    Begin with distributive behavior, reach impasse and switch to integration
  19. Power
    The ability to change others' states through giving or withholding resources or punishments
  20. What are the 5 power bases?
    • information
    • legitimate
    • coercive/reward
    • referent
    • expert
  21. BATNA
    Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
  22. WATNA
    Worst Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement
  23. Giebes, De Dreu and Van de Vliert (2000), exit options
    • Negotiated in dyads, either one side or both side had a negotiation "partner" who would switch with them in negotiation
    • Dyads motivated to cooperate or compete
    • Problem solving behavior does not differ in two-sided, but is more cooperative when one-sided
    • General threats: competitively motivated participants present more threats in one-sided
    • Joint outcomes: one-sided lead to lower joint outcomes
  24. Power dispersion
    • Differences in concentration of power among group members
    • low dispersion: everyone is equal, eglatarian
    • high dispersion: one is higher, hierarchical
  25. Greer and Van Kleef (2010)
    • High vs. low power dispersion teams
    • High status people have less conflict and higher joint outcomes in low dispersion
    • Low status people have less conflict and higher joint outcomes in high dispersion
  26. What are the types of conflict issues?
    • resources/interests
    • values
    • process
  27. Interest Conflict
    • Stronger FPP
    • Lower intentions to cooperate
    • More tradeoffs
    • Higher joint outcomes
  28. Value Conflict
    • Weaker FPP
    • Higher intentions to cooperate (initially)
    • Less problem solving
    • Lower joint outcomes
  29. Fixed pie perception (FPP)
    • Idea that the other party wants the opposite of what you want and the more you get the less the other party gets
    • Most negotiators start with FPP, the sooner it's resolved, the better
  30. Is fixed pie perception weaker in value or interest conflict?
    Value conflict
  31. Are intentions to cooperate higher in value or interest conflicts?
    Value conflicts, at least in the beginning
  32. How does the conflict issue affect negotiation behavior and outcomes?
    • No differences in forcing behavior
    • Less problem solving in value conflict than resource conflict
    • Higher joint outcome for resource than value
  33. Do breaks lead to higher joint outcomes?
    • When used as a distraction from negotiation rather than a reflection
    • When participants are primed with cooperative rather than competitive thoughts
    • Reflection and cooperation are okay, reflection and competition are not
  34. Why is integrative negotiation not the default negotiation style?
    • Dilemma of openness and honesty
    • Dilemma of trust
    • Errors in perception and cognition
  35. Stereotyping
    Defining individual by group type
  36. Halo effect
    Judging a person based on one piece of positive information
  37. Selective perception
    Judging a person based on one negative trait
  38. Projection
    Assuming the other party is the same as you
  39. Framing
    Point of view you take when observing the world
  40. Gain vs. loss focus
    Reward focus or focus on avoiding losses
  41. De Dreu, Koole, & Steinel (2000)
    Accountability reduces FPP through increased processing of information
  42. Anchoring
    • Assimilation of judgement to a salient standard of comparison
    • Tend to use first offers as anchors, so they are strong predictors of outcomes
  43. What are countermeasures of anchoring in negotiation?
    Thinking of the opponent's BATNA, reservation point and one's own target
  44. Self-serving biases
    Fundamental attribution error: negotiation behavior is caused by the situation, but attributed to personality of negotiator
  45. Morris, Larrick, & Su (1999)
    • Two students negotiated over a job
    • BATNAs of recruits were manipulated (low or high, risky or certain)
    • Risky BATNA-->uncertain-->judged as unstable
    • High BATNA-->haggling-->judged as unagreeable
  46. Steinel, Abele, & De Dreu (2007)
    • Face to face roleplay with integrative potential, 2 different negotiations
    • 3 conditions: negotiation experience, advice and advice/experience
    • Increased judgement accuracy in advice/experience
    • Slightly more problem solving in advice, large increase for advice/experience
  47. Winner's curse
    When first offer is accepted
  48. What is the effect of overconfidence on negotiation?
    • Less willing to explore alternatives
    • Prefer third party negotiation
  49. Endowment effect
    Tendency to value the things you posses higher
  50. Emotion vs. mood
    • Moods: less focused on specifics, less intense, more enduring
    • Emotions: directed at targets, more intense, less enduring
  51. Intrapersonal effects for positive and negative emotions
    • How emotions affect self
    • Positive emotions lead to more integrative behavior, positive attitude of other party and persistance
    • Negative emotions lead to more distributive and competitive behavior, decrease in ability to analyze, escalates conflict
  52. Valence
    Whether emotion is positive or negative
  53. What are the types of negative emotions and their effect on negotiation?
    • Dejection-related: absence of positive outcomes, aggression
    • Agitation-related: presence of negative outcomes, leave negotiation
    • Anger: expect high outcomes, competitive
    • Envy: more likely to lie
    • Anxiety: low first offers, exit early, expect lower outcomes
  54. Klinnert et. al. (1983)
    • Infants used mother's emotional expressions to cross a visual cliff
    • Emotions act as social information
  55. What are the inferential processes of emotions?
    • Emotions contain social information
    • Anger tells you that you did something wrong
    • Sadness tells you someone needs help
  56. What are the affective effects of emotion?
    • Emotions tend to invoke resulting emotions
    • Anger invokes anger or fear in others
    • Happiness invokes happiness or hope
  57. EASI
    Emotion as social information model
  58. What are the two key forces in whether inferential or affective processes are used?
    • Information processing: motivation and ability to decode information in emotions, more thorough IP-->inferential process, less thorough-->affective reactions
    • Social relational nature of relationship: cultural norms, way emotion is expressed, distant and more appropriate relationship-->inferential, closer and less appropriate-->affective
  59. Van Kleef et. al. (2004)
    • Negotiators received info about other party's emotions
    • Gave in more to angry negotiators than happy
    • Emotional expressions only useful for those with low need for cognitive closure
    • The less time pressure, the more strongly participants were affected by emotion
  60. Anger and power
    • Anger from a high power signals toughness and high limits
    • Anger from a low power evokes anger, opponents don't care about high limits
  61. Supplication in negotiation
    Signals dependency and need for support, opponents make more concessions
  62. Appeasement in negotiation
    Signals self-reproach and that one has done something wrong, opponents stand firm and wait for a concession
  63. Anger and disappointment in negotiation
    Anger directed at the offer and disappointment directed at the person results in higher outcomes
  64. Rational choice theory
    The recipient in an ultimatum bargaining game should chose any offer greater than zero, not found to be true
  65. Guth, Schmittberger, Schwarze (1982)
    • Central issue is fairness
    • Allocators most frequently offer 50-50
    • Recipients frequently reject offers <30%
  66. Types of bargaining paradigms
    • Dictator game: allocator's offer must be accepted
    • Delta game: if offer is rejected, multiplied by delta (between 0 and 1)
    • Lambda game: if offer is rejected, multiplied by lambda for allocater and 1-lambda for recipienct
  67. What are the two components of the social utility model?
    • Absolute payoff or self-interest
    • Comparative component or taste for fairness
  68. Kagel, Kim, & Moser (1996)
    • Negotiators split 100 coins
    • Coins are worth twice as much to allocator, recipient thinks 50-50 is fair
    • Allocators are not fair, but strategic
  69. What is communicated in negotiation?
    • Offers, counteroffers and motives
    • BATNA
    • Outcomes
    • Social accounts
    • Process remarks
  70. How do negotiators communicate?
    • Language
    • Nonverbal communication
    • Channel/media
  71. How can you improve communication in negotiation?
    • Ask questions
    • Use active listening
    • Role reversal
  72. End-result ethics
    Utilitarianism: rightness of an action determined by its consequences
  73. Duty ethics
    Kantianism/golden rule: universal standards of morality
  74. Social contract ethics
    Rousseau: rightness determined by community norms
  75. What are negotiation tactics considered marginally ethical?
    • Traditional competitive bargaining
    • Emotional manipulation
    • Misrepresentation
    • Misrepresentation to opponent's networks
    • Inappropriate information gathering
    • Bluffing
  76. What are some examples of the importance of justifying unethical behavior?
    • It is important to appear honest: 50-50 coin split
    • Given a choice between an empty room and one with a handicapped person, most people will choose the empty room if a different TV show is playing
    • Die under cup: more people lie about results with multiple rolls
  77. Koning et. al. (2010, 2011)
    • Behavior depends on your goal and means
    • Lambda game, chips worth twice as much to participant
    • Given opportunity to lie or deceive about value
    • Deceived more in powerless than powerful conditions
  78. What are the different types of social value orientations and what options will they choose in negotiation?
    • Competitive: choose option with greatest difference between themselves and opponent
    • Prosocial: choose fairest option
    • Proself: choose option with greatest benefit for self
  79. What are the dimensions in Hostede's traditional approach to culture?
    • Individualism/collectivism
    • Masculinity/femininity
    • Uncertainty avoidance
    • Power distance
  80. What are the dimensions of Leung & Cohen's model of cultural logics?
    • Dignity: inherent worth of a person independent of others, internal
    • Honor: worth in other's eyes, external
    • Face: worth within hierarchy, external
  81. What are the origins of honor cultures?
    • Small communities with predatory risk
    • Beyond the reach of state or justice
    • Vigilance and self-defense are only forms of defense
    • Preoccupation with positive image
    • Defend honor with aggression
  82. What are the most important domains in social evaluation?
    Morality (intentions) and competence (might or power)
  83. What is the difference between honor cultures and non-honor cultures in perceiving insults?
    • A rude response from someone who cut in line considered more offensive in honor cultures
    • High honor-- more likely to evaluate insults in terms of morality
    • Low honor-- more likely to evaluate competence
    • Effect is mediated by extent to which participants take offense to insult
  84. Regulatory focus
    Different ways or strategies to reach goals
  85. What are some positive characteristics of honor cultures?
    • More polite than non-honor participants
    • Less supportive of destructive behavior
    • More helpful
  86. What are the characteristics of an ideal regulatory focus?
    • Used by underdogs
    • Take more risks
    • Focus on promotion
  87. What are the characteristics of a necessity regulatory focus?
    • Used by star player
    • Play it safe, vigilance
    • Prevention focus
  88. What is the relationship between honor and behavior?
    Those high in honor use more accommodating behavior, those low in honor use more dominating behavior
  89. Why are those high in honor more accommodating?
    They have a necessity regulatory focus which gives them a tendency to prevent losing honor
  90. What countries are high in individualism?
    Netherlands, USA
  91. What countries/areas are high in power distance?
    Malaysia, Philippines, Central South America
  92. What countries are high in quality of life (femininity)?
    Netherlands, Scandinavia
  93. What countries are high in uncertainty avoidance?
    Greece, Portugal, Belgium
  94. Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky (2001)
    • Stereotype threat/reactance
    • Pretest: 48% expect males to do better than females in negotiation
    • Men perform better than women when participants are told the task is diagnostic of negotiation ability
    • Men perform better when gender stereotypes are implicitly primed
    • Women perform better when stereotypes are explicitly primed
  95. Kray et. al. (2002)
    • When female traits linked to negotiation success, women outperformed men
    • When neutral traits linked to negotiation success, men outperformed women
    • When male traits linked to failure, women outperform men
    • When female traits linked to failure, men outperform women
  96. Bear & Babcock (2012)
    Gender differences disappear when negotiation topics are more feminine
  97. Public goods
    Individuals must contribute for the common good
  98. Resource dilemma
    Individuals share resources, must decide how much to take
  99. What are motivational solutions to solving social dilemmas?
    • Transformations: changing the way the problem is perceived
    • Communication: state cooperative intent
    • Identification with group: "us" vs "me"
  100. Reciprocity
    "tit for tat," strategic solution, do whatever the other player does
  101. What are structural solutions to social dilemmas?
    • Modify the payoff structure: take away incentive to defect
    • Sanctions: causes higher cooperation rates, but they disappear when sanctions are removed
    • Cooperation decreases as group size increases
  102. Discontinuity effect
    Conflicts between groups are more competitive than between individuals
  103. What are the motives behind the discontinuity effect?
    • Fear: expectation that the other will defect
    • Greed: want the highest outcome for self
  104. Social support explanation
    Group members support the goal of self-interest, it's okay to be greedy
  105. Identifiabilty explaination
    Hide behind group identity, anonymity
  106. Schema-based distrust or fear explanation
    Groups are trusted less than individuals
  107. What are the moderators of the discontinuity effect?
    • Opponent strategy
    • Procedural independence
    • Communication
    • Non-correspondence of outcomes
  108. Minimum resource theory
    Input determines the formation of coalitions
  109. Pivotal power
    Number of coalition possibilities
  110. Critical vs. noncritical input
    • Critical: one with the most resources is needed, so is included
    • Noncritical: one with the most resources claims most of the outcome, so is excluded
  111. What are the tendencies of representative negotiators?
    • Want to make favorable impressions
    • Believe group favors aggressive approach
    • Less willing to conceed
    • People on the outskirts of their group are more competitive and less cooperative
    • Higher need to belong leads to more competitive than cooperative behavior
  112. Self-categorization theory
    Being a part of a group is critical to one's self-concept
  113. Hawks vs. doves
    • Hawks: self-interest, competitive
    • Doves: other-interest, cooperative
    • Hawks have a greater impact on level of cooperation than doves
    • Minority of hawks affects negotiation, minority of doves does not
  114. How many hours per week are spent in conflict in the workforce worldwide?
    2 hours worldwide
  115. What are the consequences of intragroup conflict?
    • Stress
    • Lower work satisfaction
    • Worse decision making
    • Burn-out
  116. Groupthink
    Too much cohesion, members of group are afraid to challenge opinions
  117. Is task conflict disruptive or productive?
    • De Dreu & Weingart found 20 studies with negative results and 6 positive
    • Another meta-analysis found 36 positive and 49 negative
    • Positive effect when present without relationship conflict
    • More effective in high management than low management
  118. Ego threat
    • Become very defensive and competitive when ego is threatened
    • Causes an escalation of commitment to one's own viewpoint
  119. Driving riddle study
    • Each participant given different information, must use info together to solve riddle
    • More likely to identify correct person when there is no relationship conflcit
  120. Pluralistic strategy
    Treat all group members the same, works better than particularistic strategies
  121. De Dreu and Van Vianen (2001)
    • Analyzed conflict strategies: collaborating, contending, avoiding and third party
    • Best strategy to combat relationship conflict is avoidance

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