How did British paternalism differ in Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar? In what ways were these areas governed similarly?
British paternalism was approached in different ways to the respective areas of Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, and Zanzibar. In Uganda, British paternalism was embodied through the Buganda Agreement of 1900. In this agreement, the people of Uganda undertook to collect and pay taxes to the colonial administration, recognizing the sovereignty of the British crown. Due to this economic loyalty, “the traditional ruling hierarchy was retained complete with kabaka, lukiko, or legislature, katikiro, and other chiefly offices, all with full government functions but always subject to the ultimate authority of Britain” (July 377). There was also a revolutionary system of land tenure instituted by Special Commissioner Harry Johnston “whereby all land was divided, half for the crown and half for some four thousand chiefs” (July 377). Therefore a small number of British officials administered to this area headed by the governor and overlaid upon an African chiefly hierarchy. By doing this, colonial administration determined general policy, but the details of government were left to the chiefs, ensuing a perspective of something like a treaty between sovereign states and “managed over the years to maintain a show of autonomy although conceding ultimate authority to their British protectors” (July 378). Although there was tension at times, generally this was a profitable agreement for both ends. British paternalism differed greatly from Uganda in Kenya, where the focus of the Europeans was to develop the country of Kenya where a railroad had been placed, offsetting the cost of administration and public works. In the beginning, little land was given to the people, and with what land was given there was no way for the people to make an adequate living. As Europeans struggled to develop the country through farming, Europeans “were not expected to engage in competition with native Africans nor to perform manual labor. Custom dictated, therefore, that farmers employ black workers, even if few could afford to pay wages attractive enough o entice the peasant from a familiar way of life” (July 381). The European settlers’ main desire was to press the administration unceasingly for privileges they believed were theirs based on right of position and talent, leading to requests for more laborers and passing the Resident Natives Ordinance destroying any opportunities for laborers to thrive on their own. This act “helped set a pattern of two societies, segregated economically and socially, the one resting on the privilege of race and status supported by official fiat, the other locked in a position of inferiority and made to subserve the interests of the first” (July 382). This led to racial discrimination, with a small white minority privileging themselves over Africans (and Asians) through manipulation of the machinery of government. Clearly, this was not as equal of an agreement as Uganda. However, roles were eventually reversed in 1929 when the Labourites returned to power in Britain and protected African land rights, representation on legislative councils, and responsible government actions of the British. British paternalism in Tanganyika was more similar to Uganda. Previously colonized by Germany, “the new administration was at once characterized by a sense of commitment to protect colonial charges against exploitation while preparing them for eventual self-government” (July 391). In 1925, progress began to be completed with the arrival of Sir Donald Cameron who had a personal temperament, experience as chief secretary to the government in Nigeria, as well as a conviction that effective administration could only exist when based on indigenous institutions, leading to his system of indirect rule. This system was comprised of government through local authorities, “investing them initially with responsibility for maintenance of order and collection of taxes, later adding judicial functions, while encouraging local financing and direction of community development projects” (July 391). Although Cameron was criticized for compulsion, this rule encouraged the success and independence of the Africans, rather than placing British authority and superiority on the forefront. British rule in Zanzibar was also more along the lines of Uganda, “[supporting] the status quo which in this case meant government through the agency of the Arab oligarchy” (July 393). Furthermore, in the 1920s a legislative council was introduced on which Arabs, despite their small numbers, had representation equal to that of the Africans and Asians combined in the Zanzibar area. Giving increasing control to the Arabs, in 1956 the British led to popular election of half the unofficial legislative council members, but in 1961 when responsible, ministerial government was instituted and independence was drawing near, “the Arabs managed to form a coalition with sympathetic Africans” (July 394). Although there were differences as far as the extent of which British authority was engrained, they generally kept to the status quo, giving control to local government and allowing the people to learn for themselves in order to be efficient in the future.